Girt by sea: understanding Australia’s maritime domains in a networked world

This study aims to provide the background, language and context necessary for an informed understanding of the challenges and dilemmas faced by those responsible for the efficacy of Australia’s maritime domain awareness system. Abstract Against a rapidly changing region dominated by the rise of China, India and, closer to home, Indonesia, Australia’s approaches to understanding its maritime domains will be influenced by strategic factors and diplomatic judgements as well as operational imperatives.  Australia’s alliance relationship with the United States and its relationships with regional neighbours may be expected to have a profound impact on the strength of the information sharing and interoperability regimes on which so much of Australia’s maritime domain awareness depends. The purpose of this paper is twofold.  First, it seeks to explain in plain English some of the principles, concepts and terms that maritime domain awareness practitioners grapple with on a daily basis.  Second, it points to a series of challenges that governments face in deciding how to spend scarce tax dollars to deliver a maritime domain awareness system that is necessary and sufficient for the protection and promotion of Australia’s national interests

The Regulation of Space and Cyberspace: One Coin, Two Sides

In the 1960s, during some very tense days in the Cold War the United States of America (USA) and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR) brokered a deal in the United Nations for a treaty regime to govern human activities in outer space. This regime has served well enough for almost 50 years. In recent years, however, fears of space weaponisation, the proliferation of space debris in the Low Earth Orbits (LEO) and increasing demands on the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) have led to demands for regulatory reform. Some nations now consider space to be the fourth domain of modern warfare. Meanwhile, the cyber domain continues to develop apace. The world is struggling to determine whether, and if so how, to regulate the cyberspace. The United States now considers cyberspace to be the fifth domain of warfare and has announced that it reserves the right to meet cyber attacks, on interests it considers vital, with conventional kinetic responses. The space and cyberspace domains overlap and have mutual dependencies which demand a degree of coherence and integration in legislative, policy, and regulatory responses. There are also some important differences and distinctions. This paper explores some of the dilemmas that are faced by decision-makers who seek to make both the space and cyberspace domains safe and secure places which will deliver benefit to humans across the planet long into the future

Is Australia really lost in space?

Australia is one of the world\u27s most wealthy nations. Yet to the surprise and puzzlement of many observers, Australian governments over many years steadfastly refused to become involved in space activities in ways judged to be commensurate to the nation\u27s wealth and place in the world. Repeated calls to establish a space agency were ignored or firmly rejected and civil and commercial investment in space activities was limited. In the past decade, there have been substantial developments and new investments in the policy, national security, civil and commercial domains. Perhaps the salient feature is the establishment of the Australian Space Agency in 2018. This article is a description and critical analysis of these developments. There are two key drivers to Australia\u27s approach to space. The first is Australia\u27s strategic geography, its location on Earth, its large size and small population most of whom live in a few large coastal cities. The second is national security, typically expressed though the nation\u27s alliance relationships. These have been policy constants since the late 1940s and remain so today. This article demonstrates that recent developments, including the establishment of the space agency, are best understood as opportunistic outcomes and serendipitous results of a series of events several of which had little to do with space per se. Heralded by some as a new beginning, a closer analysis confirms the continuing importance of geography and national security as the two key drivers of Australia\u27s approach to space

Building a resilient cyber security eco-system: national and regional considerations

Overview The global economy is a complex cyber ecosystem. The movement of goods and services across cities, nations and the world assumes secure and assured access to the internet. Many processes are becoming automated and all manner of devices are being connected to the internet at an accelerating rate, a phenomenon known as the Internet of Things (IoT). In March 2016 the Australian Government released its Cyber Security Strategy and this document provided important context for this IFRS study. The study also sought to understand the implications for Australia of regional approaches to cyber security and the roles that Australia might play to strengthen the cyber resilience of regional nations to their benefit and to Australia’s as well. This short report seeks to use plain English to explain concepts that have been for too long relegated by political and business leaders to technical staff who, their best efforts notwithstanding, have struggled to articulate the policy and legislative challenges that the internet, and cyberspace more generally presents to national and global society. The report, based on the individual contributions and collective judgments of a group of well-informed individuals from diverse backgrounds, makes some recommendations and suggestions that, if implemented, we think will deliver a more secure, resilient and trustworthy internet to Australia and to the region

Space security in the 21st century: roles, responsibilities and opportunities for Australia

This thesis tests the hypothesis that Australia is obligated, in practical and moral terms, to invest in the security of the orbital space environment.Since the late 1940s, Australia’s involvement in activities in the orbital space environment has been framed largely by national security considerations. Space activities are the heart of Australia’s alliance with the United States and have provided Australia insights into global space activities not available to other small and middle powers. An economic development narrative, which has been poorly articulated over many years, also exists. Persistent calls by industry advocates and enthusiasts for a succession of Australian Governments to invest in a civil and commercial space industry have largely been ignored. The Australian Space Agency was established in 2018 with an economic rationale based on figures that are weak and ill-defined. The agency has been established, ostensibly, to encourage private investment in a domestic space industry that may come to represent about 1% of the global space industry. A domestic space industry is not essential to the dominant security narrative, but is dependent on assured and secure access to services and data that satellites provide.Orbital space is a profoundly dual-use environment in which military and non-military payloads share orbits and technologies. Commercial interests, with proposals to launch very large constellations into Low Earth Orbit, are challenging the paradigm that space activity is the almost exclusive preserve of nation states. To ensure ready access to orbital space in the future, the international community - including Australia - must deal with a range of threats including that of space debris in the Low Earth Orbits (LEO). The Space Agency could become Australia’s lead organisation for space security matters, helping to protect economies, national and global, that are increasingly reliant on secure and assured access to the services provided by satellites. The thesis focusses on the period from November 2007 to the end of March 2019. The evidence from this period appears to support the hypothesis that Australia is obligated to invest in the security of the orbital space environment